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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
' 
i JOHN MICHAEL KRYGER and 
i vJILLIAM FREDERICK STEWART, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs-
I JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, 
, Jtah State Prison, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 12073 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellants appeal from a decision of the 
Honorable Leonard W. Elton, Judge, Third Judicial 
1 
'.listrict Court, denying the appellants t petition for 
awrit of habeas corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LCWER COURT 
John Michael Kryger and William Frederick Stewart 
: Plead guilty to the crime of robbery on the 10th day 
of June, 1968, in the District Court, Third Judicial 
'~. 
1'1strict, State of Utah. On December 29, 1969, a 
I 
1Petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the 
. Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County. A 
~esponse of the Attorney General was duly filed and 
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I 
pre-trial held on the matter. Hearing was held on the 
1 ioth day of April, 1970, before the Honorable Leonard 
' 
1 \v. Elton and on the 15th day of April, 1970, Judge Elton 
entered an Order denying the appellants' relief under 
: their petition. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the trial court's 
decision denying their petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about May 15, 1968, a robbery occurred in 
'.;alt Lake County. (R. 33) Thereafter the petitioners, 
Kryger and Stewart, were charged with the robbery. 
, They plead guilty to the crime of robbery and subse-
• quently filed a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus 
·alleging that their pleas of guilty were not voluntarily 
. entered. (R. 1) The appellants alleged that their 
pleas of guilty were the result of Kryger being sub-
. jected to an illegal lineup, that Kryger gave a con-
I 
: fession under circumstances that rendered it illegal 
in Stewart's case as well as Kryger's, evidence was 
obtained against them as a result of an illegal search 
and seizure. The only testimony offered at the hearing 
-2-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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on the appellants' complaint for habeas corpus was 
that of the appellants. The State offered no testimony 
to rebut their contentions. Kryger testified that he 
was arrested on May 15, 1968 at approximately 1: 00 A. M. 
(R. 33) He was pulled over at a store, his car was 
searched and he was ordered to stand on the sidewalk 
while another car circled around the road a few times. 
(R. 33) At that time Kryger was apparently identified 
1
as being one of the perpetrators of a robbery which had 
occurred earlier. He was not advised of his right to 
have counsel present at the lineup. He was identified 
apparently as having been involved in a robbery of a 
service station. (R. 34) He was then taken to the 
police station where he was interrogated. He was told 
that if he didn't give a confession he was going to 
11 serve time - a lot of time .," .," .,"" He was not advised 
~s to any of his constitutional rights. As a result 
of the coercion and interrogation he confessed to 
robbing a service station with William Stewart and 
told the officers where a knife was located which had 
apparently been used in the robbery. (R. 37-38) 
He did not give the officers permission to search the 
apartment where the knife was located. At the time 
-3 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of preliminary hearing the testimony of the confession, 
' t1 knife, whiC'h was subsequently recovered from his 
I 
i apartment, and the identification was used against 
him. He testified that this effected his plea. (R. 39-4 
~Mr. Kryger was represented by counsel but counsel did 
i 
[not discuss the question of the lineup, his confession 
or the use of evidence obtained from the apartment 
I against him. (R. 41) There was apparently no dis -
cussion to the effect that possibly these items of 
evidence could not be used in a prosecution in the 
District Court. 
William Stewart testified that he was in his 
apartment on the 15th of May, 1968, and at approximately 
4: 00 A. M. in the morning he was awakened by officers 
from the Salt Lake City Police Department. (R. 48) 
i He was immediately placed under arrest and asked where 
the knife was located. He was given no advice of his 
right to remain silent or of the other elements of 
the Miranda warning. (R. 4 9) He did not give a 
statement to the police and a search of his apartment 
disclosed nothing. Subsequently, the police returned 
to the apartment without a warrant, searched the 
-4-
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: apartment and f ouncl tlw knif0. (R. 4 9, 58, 62) At 
! the time of preliminary hearing, Kryger' s statement 
[implicating Stewart was admitted into evidence (R. 50) 
: as was the knife taken from the apartment. There was 
no discussion with Stewart's attorney, who also repre-
sented Kryger, concerning the search nor any discussion 
of a search warrant (R. 55, 62) Stewart said that his 
attorney felt that they had a weapon and a confession 
and that this was sufficient to make out a good case 
against him. (R. 56) Based upon evidence at prelim-
inary hearing and counsel rs statement, he entered a 
plea of guilty. 
I 
Neither Kryger or Stewart had graduated from high 
: school and Stewart had only a ninth grade education. 
ARGUJ:v1ENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT 
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORFUS SHaJLD BE REVERSED 
BECAUSE THE UNCONTESTED EVIDENCE DISCLOSES 
THAT APPELLANTS' PLEAS OF GUILTY WERE INDUCED 
AS A RESULT OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE. 
At the time that the appellants filed their 
Petition for writ of habeas corpus, and at the time of 
hearing before the trial court, the United States 
0 
1 
1Upreme Court had not decided the cases of McMann v. 
I Richardson - ' U.S. , 90 s. Ct. 1441; Parker v. ---
-5-
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I ~ North Carolina, U.S. , 90 S. Ct. 1458 (1970); 
' 
i and Brady v. United States, 90 S. Ct. 1463. At the 
I 
1 
time the appellants filed their petition the law was 
I 
~enerally to the effect that a plea of guilty induced 
by an illegal confession or illegally obtained evidence 
could not be deemed a voluntary plea. See Brennan, 
Dissenting, McMann v. Richardson, supra, 90 s. Ct. 1451, 
F.N. 2. However, the appellants submit that their 
case is not controlled by the principles of McMann v. 
nchardson, supra, Parker v. North Carolina, supra, or 
Brady v. United States, supra. In the instant case, 
holding Kryger for identification without affording 
i him an opportunity to have counsel present was arguably 
a violation of the United States Supreme Court's decisior 
·~United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), since 
there may have been no adequate basis for arrest, 
: :,fong Sun v. United States; Nedrud, The Supreme Court 
and the Law of Criminal Investigation, 145-148. 
Subsequent to his arrest, Kryger was taken to the Salt 
: Lake Police Department where he was interrogated without 
being warned of his constitutional rights. The failure 
to advise Kryger prior to the interrogation was a clear 
Violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
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and rendered his confession involuntary and inadmissible· 
Further, the coupling of the threats with the absence 
I 
I of a warning rendered the confession involuntary 
2specially in light of the limited education of the 
! appellant, and the circwnstances surrounding the 
interrogation. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963 
Lynumn v. Illinois, 272 U.S. 528 (1963). In addition, 
9oth Kryger and Stewart at the preliminary hearing were 
f,1ced with the lineup, the illegal confession and 
~vidence illegally seized. The use of the confession 
8f Kryger against Stewart would not be constitutionally 
I permissible at the time of trial. Indeed, both men 
: could not be tried in a common trial if Kryger' s con-
fession were to be introduced against him. Bruton v. 
I 
'1Jnited States, 3 91 U.S. 123 (1968). 
I 
The police entered the apartment of Stewart after 
1his arrest, after he had been taken to jail, and after 
; prior search of the apartment had been made and nothin~ , , 
:'mcovered. The search was without the consent of either 
:\tewart or Kryger. They recovered a knife apparently 
\used in the robbery. This search and the seizure of 
/the knife was without consent, without warrant, nor 
I 
[incident to arrest and was thus clearly unconstitutional. 
I 
I 
l~~r v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Recznik v. 
-7- -------
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
, city of Lorain, 393 U.S. 166 (1968); Shipley v. 
' -I 
i ~ifornia, 395 u.;;. 818 (1969); Preston v. United 
States, 376 U . .<;. 364 (1964). The undisputed testimony 
of Kryger and Stewart was to the ef feet that the 
I 
: illegally obtained and tainted evidence directed 
I 
, induced their pleas of guilty. Kryger further testified) 
i 
i that there was no discussion with his attorney con-
1 
i cerning his confession, the lineup, or the apparent 
I 
illegal search and seizure. (R. 41) Stewart testified 
that there was no discussion with counsel concerning 
( the search, and he also testified that the attorney 
r had indicated that since there was a confession 
and evidence uncovered at a search, a plea of guilty 
'i'las in order. It is submitted in the first instance 
that this case is within both of the two exceptions 
to the rule in McMann that a plea of guilty cures non 
jurisdictional deficiencies. The first exception is 
that this case presents a circumstance where the 
coercion of Kryger had an abiding and continuing impact 
so as to taint his plea. McMann v. Richardson, 90 S. Cy 
441, pg. 44 7. Certainly there was nothing done by the 
~lice or appointed counsel to dispel the impact of 
t~ confession, the lineup or the search. In addition, 
~yger was exposed to the confession being used against 
-8-
I 
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him at the preliminary hearing. This would appear to 
bring the matter well within the Chambers v. Florida, 
309 U.S. 227 (1940) exception noted in McMann. In 
'McMann v. Richardson, supra, the court stated the rule 
: 3.S fallows : 
nrn our view a defendant's plea of guilty 
based on reasonably competent advice is an 
intelligent plea not open to attack on the 
grounds that counsel may have misjudged the 
admissibility of the defendant's confession. 
Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent 
and therefore vulnerable when motivated 
by a confession erroneously thought admissible 
in evidence depends as an initial matter not 
on whether a court would retrospectively 
consider counsel's advise to be right or 
wrong, but on whether that advice was within 
the range of competence demanded of attorneys 
in criminal cases. On the one hand, uncertainty 
is inherent in predicting court decisions; but 
on the other hand defendants facing felon 
c arges are entitled to the e ective assistance 
of competent counsel. Beyond this we think the 
matter, for the most part, should be left to 
the good sense and discretion of the trial 
courts with the admonition that if the right 
to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution 
is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot 
be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, 
and that judges should strive to maintain 
proper standards of performance by attorneys 
who are representing defendants in criminal 
cases in their courts.n (Emphasis added) 
I This is not a case where it can be said that counsel's 
advice was within the range of competence demanded 
by attorneys in criminal cases. Alires v. Turner, 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 U.2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969). The state did not 
r call counsel to rebut the testimony of Kryger and 
Stewart that there was no discussion concerning the 
alleged illegally obtained evidence or that in fact 
the attorney felt that there was a good case against 
the petitioners. The evidence as it is now before the 
court clearly supports a determination that Kryger's 
confession was illegally extracted, and that the knife 
taken from the apartment was obtained as a result of 
illegal search and seizure. Further, there is no 
rebuttle to the assertion that counsel did not discuss 
the legal implications of these matters with appellants. 
This is not a case like Brady v. United States and 
Parker v. North Carolina, where counsel would have 
been required to anticipate future Supreme Court 
decisions. The law was clear. Under these circumstancE 
it is submitted that McMann v. Richardson compels a 
determination that the plea of guilty of the appellants 
was not free and voluntary but the product of illegally 
obtained evidence. 
-10-
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POINT II 
THE APPELLANTS' PLEA OF GUILTY WAS ACCEPTED 
IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Appellants submit, that assuming that their plea 
I is controlled by the decision of McMann v. Richardson, 
supra, as respects their federal constitutional 
allegations, that this court should rule that their 
pleas cannot stand under Article I, Section 7 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. The McMann v. 
Richardson, supra, decision is a distinct minority 
expression as respects overall judicial evaluation on 
the issue of whether a plea of guilty will be deemed 
voluntarily entered in the face of illegally obtained 
evidence. Moreno v. Beto, 415 F.2d 154 CC.A. 5th Cir. 
, 1969); United States ex rel. McCloud v. Rundle, 402 
F.2d 853 CC.A. 3d Cir. 1968); Kott v. Green, 387 F.2d 
136 (C.A. 6th Cir.1967); Reed v. Henderson, 385 F.2d 
1 995 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. 
I 
I QQllins v. Maroney, 382 F.2d 547 (C.A.3d Cir.1967); 
I ~iley v. Wilson, 378 F.2d 144 cc.A.9th Cir.1967); 
I 
·Carpenter v. Wainwright, 372 F.2d 940 CC.A. 5th Cir. 
1967); Doran v. Wilson, 369 F.2d 505 CC.A.9th Cir. 
1966); White v. Pepersack, 352 F.2d 470 CC.A.4th Cir. 
:: 1965); Zachery v. Hale, 286 F. Supp. 237 (D.C.M.D. 
-11-
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na.1968); United States ex rel. Cuevas v. Rundle, 
285 F. Supp. 647 (D.C.E.D.Pa. 1966); People v. Spencer, 
j 
66 Cal.2d 158, 57 Cal.Rptr. 163, 424 P.2d 715 (1967); ' i' 
corrunonwealth v. Baity, 428 Pa. 306, 237 A.2d 172 (1968).1 
! 
The overwheJming weight of judicial consideration 
rejects the proposition that a person who enters a plea 
of guilty as a result of illegally obtained evidence 
) enters a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. 
) Substantial reason militates against the position taken 
i by the Supreme Court in McMann v. Richardson, supra. 
:
1 
The overwhelming majority of criminal cases are settled 
without trial upon a plea of guilty. The purpose for 
I the exclusionary rule adopted in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961) was to deter police activity which violated 
the 4th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States and may be criminal (18 U.S.C. 241, etc.) 
or at least tortious. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 
(1961). If officers may now believe that if an accused 
Pleads guilty the fruits of their illegal activity 
, Will be justified the reason for complying with 
! 
, constitutional standards will be diluted. It is 
! submitted that the better rule would be that urged 
i 
) by the dissenting opinions in McMann and that this 
\ court should determine that due process of law under 
I 
-12-
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the Constitution of the State of Utah is violated where , 
an accused rs plea is a result of illegally obtained 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The pleas of guilty entered by the appellants in 
the instant case were as a result of illegally obtained 
evidence and unconstitutional police practices. The 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in McMann 
v. Richardson, supra, does not support a conclusion 
! that the pleas were voluntarily entered since there 
) was not the adequate consultation with counsel that 
I 
i 
the McMann case requires. Further, as a matter of stat 
i constitutional law, the pleas were taken in violation 
of due process. This court should reverse. 
-13-
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
College of Law 
University of Utah 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112 
Attorney for Appellants 
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